Abstract. Performing a good security analysis on the design of a system is an essential step in order to guarantee a reasonable level of protection. However, different attacks and threats may be carried out depending on the operational environment in which the system is used, i.e. the procedures that define how to operate the systems. We are interested in reasoning about the security of e-Voting procedures, namely on the risks and attacks that can be carried out during an election. Our focus is more on people and organizations than on systems and technologies. In this paper we describe some ongoing work that we are carrying out within the ProVotE project (a project sponsored by the Autonomous Province of Trento to switch to e-Voting for local elections) to analyze and (possibly) improve procedural security of electronic elections. To do so, we are providing models of the Italian electoral laws using the UML and we are developing a custom methodology for analyzing threats from the models. Our reasoning approach is based on asset mobility, asset values and existence of multiple instances.
Introduction
e-Voting is the subject of great debates and its adoption in various countries has been slow and/or cause of controversies. (see, e.g., [1, 2] ). A major concern is security: without proper protection and effective control procedures, malicious actors may instantiate a range of threat actions, with effects varying from a "denial of service" (e.g. stopping the election in a polling station by sabotaging some e-Voting machines) up to alteration of the results (e.g. by successfully changing votes in some key precincts).
Interestingly, paper voting and the procedures regulating "paper" elections have weaknesses and possible attacks, that can usually be carried out under the hypothesis of multiple "failures" (e.g. a ballot is stolen before the election and the polling officers do not realize it). The usage of electronic devices, however, shifts and amplifies some of the risks.
We are interested in reasoning about the procedural security of elections, and, in particular, electronic elections, that is, on the procedures and controls that regulate the usage of e-Voting machines. We focus, in particular, on techniques to highlight possible threats, in order to derive security and assurance requirements.
Some interesting approaches to perform procedural security have been proposed in the past in [3, 4, 5, 6] , and other general security analysis techniques in [7, 8] . Voting, however, differs from the environment in which these methodologies are most effective for the following reasons (see also [2, 9, 10] ):
-asset mobility: assets and sensible data related to an election are handled (and may be altered) by different actors (e.g., technicians, poll officers, electoral officers) with different responsibilities over time and in different locations; -asset evolution: assets related to an election change their value over time.
The effects of an attack on an asset change dramatically according to the period in which the attack is performed (e.g. tampering with an e-Voting machine after the election does not have much of an effect); -number of instances: various electoral assets need to be replicated for running an election. The effects of an attack may not only propagate to copies, if the master is compromised, but may also have a different impact, depending on the number of instances that are affected by the attack (e.g. breaking one e-Voting machine may not have a tangible effect on an election).
In order to deal with the points mentioned above, we devised a methodology for modeling (electoral) processes and for modeling and analyzing threats. The methodology is based on the following steps.
-First, we provide a model in the UML that describes the procedures under analysis. The model, mainly based on activity diagrams, provides information about the assets handled by the procedures and their relevant states, called asset-states (e.g. responsibility, location, value, number of instances). The model must follow precise conventions, that we defined in the form of stereotypes that can be used (we defined some stereotypes to enrich the meaning of certain UML elements), what UML elements and constructs can be used, how the model has to be structured, the minimum set of information that has to be provided for each procedure and asset. -Secondly, we provide a set of threat actions that can be performed on the assets. Threat actions modify the values and/or the state of assets. We group threat actions into simple actions (such as delete, destroy, use, etc) and composed actions (such as replace, copy, etc). -Thirdly, the threat actions are injected in the model in order to generate an extended model. In the extended model attacks can be performed, namely threat actions may be composed and executed and cause changes of states of assets. -Finally, we analyse the extended model in order to evaluate the impact of attacks. The asset-domain model combined with the asset-threat model is currently analyzed by hand. However, the problem can be expressed in terms of a satisfiability problem and thus allow the usage of tools such as model checkers [11] .
The methodology described above is being applied within the ProVotE project to electoral laws of the Autonomous Province of Trento and of Regione FriuliVenezia Giulia, two Italian territories that have autonomy over local elections and are considering a transition to e-Voting. The ProVotE project, sponsored by the Autonomous Province of Trento, has the goal of introducing e-Voting for local elections. Within the project we are defining the law, the procedures, and the e-Voting system that will be used for local elections. So far, the ProVotE e-Voting system has been used in five different trials involving about 11,000 citizens (see [12, 13] for some more details about the project).
This paper describes the work we are carrying out concerning the definition of the procedures and shows some of its advantages and limitations of the approach we propose. In particular, we provided models that describes the electoral procedures and we are now using such models to investigate threats. The final goal is that of providing a set of changes to the local laws that regulate e-Voting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some hints on the modeling methodology we have defined. Section 3 describes how we characterize assets, an important detail to perform threat-analysis. Section 4 describes how we perform threat-analysis. Finally, Section 5 and Section 6 provide some comparison to related work and some conclusions.
A Methodology for Modeling Electoral Process
The introduction of new technologies in the polling stations changes the risks and attacks that can compromise or invalidate an election. Such risks and attacks not only depend upon the security level the new systems provide, but also on the procedures and controls regulating the way in which the systems are operated.
In order to understand the legal, technical, and administrative issues related to the introduction of e-voting systems, therefore, we believe that a proper (business) process modeling is essential.
As a minimum requirement, such process model should at least be:
1. Simple: all the stakeholders and, in particular, stakeholders with little or no technical background, should be able to read and understand the model. This is essential in order, e.g., to disambiguate the interpretation of certain norms, by using the model as a common language between (business) analysts and people with legal background; 2. Complete: all the significant elements in the law should be mappable to elements of the model (e.g. actor and responsibilities, resources and operations on them, constraints); 3. Formal: all the items in the model should be given a precise and unambiguous meaning, in order to enable simulations and/or of formal verification; 4. Maintainable: the organization of the model and of its elements should follow precise and machine-verifiable conventions, in order to guarantee a minimum level of quality, uniformity, and maintainability.
Various works describe how to use the UML for modeling business process (see e.g. [14, 15] ). However, little is usually said on the third and fourth points above, namely formalization of the model and maintenance. Moreover, some of the peculiarities of the e-Voting domain needed specific strategies for an effective modeling.
We decided therefore to define a tool-supported modeling methodology which could help us address the points above and some of the peculiarities of the electoral domain. The notation basically conforms to the approaches proposed in the past. The "added value" is a set of rules and conventions, described in [16, 17] , that simplify maintenance and allow to more closely match the notation to some peculiarities of the electoral laws.
The methodology is based on the following elements:
-Process hierarchy: all the processes (represented with use cases) are organized in a hierarchy. While the higher levels in the hierarchy represent "containers", the leaves represent "executable" processes; the hierarchy is implemented through stereotyped relationships among use cases. The stereotypes allow for "aliasing" (use different names/reuse the same process in various contexts) and for process decomposition. Hierarchical organization, in our experience, helped in browsing and maintaining the model; -Actors and responsibility: for each "executable" process we specify what actors participate in the process and who is responsible. This information not only allows to describe who does what during the execution of a process, but, more importantly in the context of this work, who manages what data and with what privileges (see also next item). During the execution of the process, the responsible actor is liable for the assets on which the process operates; -Activities and assets: for each "executable" process we provide its specification using an activity diagram. Activities within the diagram are linked to assets they manipulate, using the CRUD notation (create, read, update, and delete). To do so, we use a facility introduced with UML 1.4, that allows to associate activities and entities, and stereotypes to provide the precise meaning of the association. Special stereotypes are used for "passing" assets among processes. The notation allows to determine precisely all the operations that are performed on assets during the execution of the processes. -Time and other "accessory" information: for each process we provide traceability to the norms (using a hierarchy of packages and stereotyped classes) and other information (such as the time frame within which the process has to take place and the multiplicity of assets). "Executable" processes, moreover, are documented in natural language for documentation purposes.
The methodology is supported by an extended version of Visual-Paradigm for UML (VP for short) [18] . In particular, the management of model elements and diagrams is performed using the standard facilities VP provides. We have developed a set of plug-ins (using the Java API VP provides to access and manipulate models) for: The methodology has been applied to the electoral laws of the Autonomous Province of Trento that regulate elections of majors in cities and provincial elections. The model includes three different systems, as the law for electing the major distinguishes among "small" towns (with less than 3000 voters) and "bigger" towns. The models are being used as the basis for the definition of the procedures that will regulate electronic elections.
A second case study is represented by the law regulating local polls in Regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia, for which we defined the model regulating the electronic poll which will be held in November 2007 in two small municipalities of the Region. To say a few things about the model dimensions -i.e., how the model is complex -it contains about 100 processes, 50 actors, 76 use cases, and 49 activity diagrams involving many assets.
Asset Properties: A Framework to Understand an Asset
An important aspect of the methodology is the how we characterize assets, which contain all the sensitive information. The features of an asset and the way in which such features are changed by the procedures, in fact, provide a lot of information to understand, e.g., possible weaknesses of the procedures and the impact of attacks. There are various definition given to an asset, however, we follow the following definition given in [19] : "An asset is something in information system and subjected to security evaluation due to its sensible values and its vulnerabilities." In our approach, assets are characterized by nature, value, location, number of instances, and properties (see also Figure 1 ).
The nature of an asset determines how certain properties are inherited. The nature of an asset is immutable: it cannot be changed during the execution of the procedures. In our formalization, assets can be primitive (such as names, symbols, keywords, passwords, electronic ballots and electronic data in general) or containers, when they can contain other asset(s) (e.g. a memory support that can contain electronic ballots).
The value of an asset (which we represent qualitatively e.g. no value, high value), allows to reason about the impact of threats (e.g. an attack to an asset with no value does not cause any harm). The initial value of primitive assets is assigned in the model by the analyst (the execution of an activity may change the value of an asset). The value of containers is determined by their intrinsic value (determined by the analyst) together with the value of the assets they contain.
Asset might be placed in several locations as well as being in transition between various locations. In our framework, therefore, assets are situated in a location (e.g. an electoral office, a safe, a container asset). Breaking into a location or being able to access a container is a mean to lead an attack against a (contained) asset (e.g. stealing a memory support containing electronic ballots allows to attack the electronic ballots). The initial locations are determined by the analyst; locations can be changed by the execution of an activity; the location of primitive assets corresponds to the location of the containers in which they reside. A container asset can be a relative location for another container assets (see Figure 1) .
Fig. 1. Characterizing assets
The number of copies (called number of instances) is particularly relevant in the electoral domain because the same assets are replicated many times, for example, when printing the ballots, and copies go through different responsible people. In addition, this is also important to estimate the effects of realizing a threat against an asset before or afterward a cloning operation.
In addition to the the above mentioned qualities, we also allow to characterize an asset by means of properties, that describe the current situation of the asset, such as the security measures that are enacted (e.g. a safe can be closed, a file can be stored plain or encrypted ). While for any domain there can be domainspecific states of the asset, we are particularly interested in security statessuch as, open, closed, unsigned, signed, encrypted, plain.
We call state of an asset the values of the features of an asset (i.e. value, location, number of instances, and property) at a given instance, and we call asset-flow the sequence of states through which an asset goes during the execution of a process. Figure 2 shows an excerpt of the procedure that is followed during project trials for delivering the voting software to the polling stations. (The ProVotE e-Voting solution is based on DRE with voters verified audit trail which is installed and used in polling offices; the software for running the machines and cryptographic keys are prepared and sent to the polling station analogously to what happen for "paper" elections in Italy). The diagram is a simplification both of the assets and of the procedure, for the sake of presentation: various details related, e.g., to the PIN management and to the password used to encrypt/decrypt the software are omitted.
The diagram shows how, before the election, the Electoral Office encrypts the e-Voting software and creates a memory support which contains the final software release. The responsible person at the Electoral Office then prepares an envelope with the PIN code (to activate the voting functions) and the memory support. A carrier (e.g. a police officer, messenger in the diagram) takes the envelope and delivers it to the polling station, where the polling officers, once verified that the envelope is sealed, open it, insert the memory support in the voting machines, insert the PIN and start the voting operations.
Asset Threats and Attacks: Understanding the "how"
By assigning each asset a value and a location we can highlight in our model where a threat may be implemented and how much harm it can cause. E.g. a denial of service could be caused by deleting a valuable asset (an asset whose value is non-null) when the asset is in a given location. The notation, however, does not allow to represent the "how", e.g. the flow of actions causing termination of the procedures in some undesired state, nor to reason about composition of threats, that is, what happens if multiple assets are attacked simultaneously. To tackle these issue, we propose the concepts of asset threats and attacks.
We define an asset threat as what an adversary might try to do to an asset. More formally we represent threat actions as activities that can transform assets and/or their state. To carry out an asset threat, the adversary may need to execute one or more (more elementary) asset threats against other asset (for example, "adversary reads [password] and signs [data]"). We distinguish therefore between basic threat actions and composed threat actions. The former are "elementary" actions, while the latter are obtained by composing basic actions to produce more complex behaviors. Figure 3 presents two examples of threat actions, delete and replace. Delete (left hand side of the figure) takes as input an asset and resets the number of instances and the value. Replace (right hand side of the figure) takes as input two assets and returns the second asset. Replace action is a composed action of delete and write: that is, after deleting from an asset some (or all) of its value, the resulting malicious asset is again modified with wrong data and reintroduced in the asset-flow.
Finally, we define an attack as a sequence of asset-threats that lead to an undesired state. The extended model can now be used to analyze the possible attacks. This is done by "executing" the model and analyzing execution paths leading to undesired states. For instance, in the extended model of Figure 4 it is possible to implement at least three different attacks. The first one consists in replacing the software which is sent to the polling stations. By reading the password 1 with which the electionSW is encrypted and substituting a modified version of the software in the MemorySupport it is possible, for a malicious actor, to deliver a modified copy of the software to the polling station. The second one consists in replacing the PIN. A malicious actor with access to the PIN code may substitute the PIN which is loaded in the envelope and thus, have a wrong PIN delivered to the polling station (eventually causing a denial of service -namely the voting functions cannot be activated by the polling officers). The third attack consists in deleting (or destroying) the envelope during transportation, possibly causing another denial of service.
The example, although trivial, shows how -by reasoning on the extended model -it is possible to explicitly represent the attacks that can be carried out, determine what assets are needed by the attackers and when, and who can carry the attacks. Notice that, similarly to what happens in model checking, we do not provide any information about the likelihood of the attacks. However, even in this simple case, we believe that the output the attacks can provide experts the information and the requirements to enhance the current procedures, to eliminate certain attacks or, at least, to make them more difficult to implement.
A few words need to be spent on injection strategies and automation of the analysis, currently carried out by hand. Since attacks depend on what threatactions are carried out, the effectiveness of the analysis depends upon the injection strategy that is chosen. It turns out that the best injection strategy consists in injecting all possible threat-actions at all possible steps of the nominal procedures. Using this approach analyzing the attacks becomes similar to a model checking problem in which the required final state of some key assets is expressed using LTL/CTL and the counter-example generated by executing the extended model contains the sequence of threat-actions causing the final state not to be reached. The approach (injection and analysis) is similar to the one proposed for the FSAP/NuSMV-SA platform for safety analysis [20] .
Related Work
A proposal for responsibilities and privileges of the actors involved in e-Voting is presented in [21] . The work focuses on Internet voting and has the goal of providing a description of the role of each actor together with the clear indication of what each actor is expected to do with the system processes and defining an operational framework that harmonizes the current (technological) security features of the system and allows to talk about "secure e-Voting system". Differently from this work, our work specifically proposes a modeling in terms of assets and processes and explicitly provides means for assessing threat actions and attacks.
In [3, 4] , the authors discuss the need for procedural security in electronic elections and provide various examples of procedural risks occurred during trials in the UK. The same authors in [22] also investigate the need for applying business process re-engineering for electoral process. Our work, while sharing the same motivations for procedural security, focuses more on the technical aspects rather than on the motivational aspects, by presenting a methodology to model electoral processes and a technique to represent attacks.
In [6, 23] , an approach to measure relative security attack surfaces is explained. The authors defined three abstract dimensions for system's attack surfaces: targets and enablers, channels and protocols, and access rights, in order to measure the "attackability" of a system and highlight correlation of bug counts with system vulnerabilities. Moreover, the authors use a state machine model to represent the behavior of an adversary attacking the system. However, differently from our work, their goal is on system design and to determine whether one version of a system is more secure than another with respect to a fixed set of dimensions.
Conclusions and Future Work
Analyzing the security of procedures in e-Voting is an essential task to guarantee adequate security levels, as threats and attacks may not only derive from pitfalls in the electronic systems, but also from ill-designed procedures. The transition to a new way of voting is challenging in several areas, social, technological, procedural and the switch to a new system often has procedural implications and risks that are challenging to assess and evaluate.
Since asset mobility, asset state, asset evolution, and the context in which asset instances are used in e-Voting are an inherent challenge, we have developed a methodology for procedural security analysis which focused on asset and asset flows. The methodology can be used to analyze and evaluate the impact of threats and, consequently, to come out with a set of (security) procedural requirements that guarantee the desired level of protection. We presented the approach by introducing the guidelines we follow for modeling the electoral procedures and hinted its usage through a simple example. Moreover, this kind of reasoning has the potential to serve as a trust building measure in the new e-Voting processes.
The work described in this paper is ongoing. Future work will address finer grained points related to the semantics of asset-flows and automation of the model extension and model analysis via model checking.
